A paper on ingratitude (R&R)

I argue that the distinctive moral mistake of ingratitude is a failure to properly register the importance of the benefactor’s regard for the beneficiary.

“Directed Nonduties”

I argue that that directed duties are not the only kind of directed normative considerations.

“Quality of Will: Expression or Possession?”

I suggest that actions can express objectionable attitudes and evaluations that an agent does not actually possess, and that this might explain why guilt and resentment can be fitting in unusual cases—such as those involving apparent moral dilemmas—even in the absence of ill will.

“Participant Respect”

I sketch a previously ignored form of moral respect, “participant respect,” which requires us to recognize others as moral participants by publicly affirming the importance of their duties to others.

A paper on valuing persons

I argue some actions and attitudes (e.g., love, grief, and demands for apology) constitute valuing two people at once, each for their own sake, and do so in a way that suggests that the value of particular persons is in a deep sense interdependent on the value of others particular persons.

“Dignity’s Demands”

I argue that contemporary accounts of dignity—which associate it with entitlements—miss something important that traditional conceptions captured well: that dignity can manifest in the possession of obligations.